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WHAT HAVE YOU DONE WITH MY
LAWYER?: THE GRAND JURY WITNESS'S
RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH COUNSEL
"If you described what happened in this case to a stranger and
didn't [say] what country it had happened in, America is not the first
place that would come to mind."'
I. INTRODUCTION
The facts of Gabbert v. Conn2 are a perfect story line-a movie
about a win-at-all-costs prosecutor who wields the power of the state
and the grand jury against a helpless witness in an attempt to force
her to incriminate herself. The movie opens with the beginning of, 3
jury deliberations in the Menendez brothers' first murder trial. Los
Angeles County Deputy District Attorneys David Conn and Carol
Najera learn of and begin to look for a letter that Lyle Menendez has
written to his ex-girlfriend, Traci Baker. In the letter, Menendez al-
legedly instructs Baker to lie under oath if she is called to testify.
4
1. Audio tape of Oral Argument, Gabbert v. Conn, 131 F.3d 793 (9th Cir.
1997), No. 95-56610 (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge Michael Daly Haw-
kins) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Audio tape
of Oral Argument].
2. 131 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998).
3. See id. at 797. The highly-publicized Menendez trial involved one of
the most sordid murder cases in recent years. Brothers Lyle and Erik Menen-
dez were tried for the 1989 shotgun killing of their parents at the family's Bev-
erly Hills mansion. See Sally Ann Stewart, Beverly Hills Horror Story, USA
TODAY, Sept. 21, 1993, at Al. Lyle and Erik Menendez were first tried si-
multaneously but before separate juries. See id. Each brother attempted to
justify the killing by asserting that they suffered abuse at their parents'
hands-to the point that they feared for their lives. See id. All twenty-four ju-
rors found the brothers had killed their parents, but neither jury could agree on
whether the brothers had committed murder or manslaughter, and whether they
had conspired to kill their parents. See HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY: THE
DIARY OF A MENENDEZ JUROR xx-xxii (1995). On retrial the brothers were
sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole. See Ann W. O'Neill,
Menendezes Given Consecutive Terms, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1996, at B 1.
4. See Gabbert, 131 F.3d at 797.
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:907
Conn and Najera subpoena Baker to testify before a grand jury and to
produce any correspondence from Lyle Menendez.5
The following day, Baker's attorney, Paul Gabbert, seeks to
quash the order to produce the correspondence. Conn and Najera
obtain a warrant to search Baker's apartment for correspondence
from Lyle Menendez while Gabbert is in court.6 Baker informs De-
tective Leslie Zoeller that she has given any correspondence from
Lyle to her attorney, and Zoeller relates this information to Conn and
Najera.
7
Three days later, Conn approaches Gabbert as he is walking
with Baker into the building where she will testify before the grand
jury.8 Conn asks Gabbert if he brought the "documents," meaning
the correspondence, with him. 9 Gabbert believes that Conn is refer-
ring to the motion to quash.10 Under Conn's direction, Detective
Zoeller then secures a warrant to search Gabbert. 11 Zoeller serves
Gabbert with the warrant while Gabbert is waiting with Baker out-
side the grand jury room. 12 Special Master Elliot Oppenheim begins
searching Gabbert in a private room adjacent to the grand jury
room. 13
Within minutes, Najera-also acting under Conn's direction-
calls Baker to testify and begins questioning her.' 4 The first question
prompts Baker to ask to leave the grand jury room to consult with
her attorney. 15 But when she leaves to talk with Gabbert, he is not
outside the room because Oppenheim is searching him.' 6  Baker
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 797-98.
9. See id. at 798.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. In Parts III and V, this Comment discusses how grand jury
models provide different ways for a witness to consult an attorney. The ma-
jority of jurisdictions do not allow witness counsel to sit inside the grand jury
room and advise the witness. Instead, the witness must ask permission to leave
the room, exit, and explain to the attorney what question was asked. The attor-
ney can then advise the witness whether to assert the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
16. See id.
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returns to the grand jury room and "on 'the advice of counsel"' as-
serts her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by
reading a prepared statement.17 The second question Najera asks
also prompts Baker to leave and speak with her attorney.18 Gabbert
is still missing.19 Baker waits for him in the hallway until a bailiff
appears and tells her to return to the grand jury. Baker again reads
the prepared statement and asserts her privilege against self-
incrimination. 20  Conn then moves to hold Baker in contempt for
failing to produce the subpoenaed documents. 21 During the grand
jury's break, "Conn, Najera, and Zoeller, with Baker in tow," join
Gabbert in the room where Special Master Oppenheim has just com-
pleted a fruitless search.22 Con directs Zoeller to conduct a "follow-
up search of Gabbert's person and effects." 23 Gabbert does not con-
sent to the second search.24
The tale of Gabbert v. Conn is one of unfairness. The prosecu-
tors orchestrated all of the events.25
[T]hey controlled the timing of the execution of the search
warrant on Gabbert and his client's grand jury appearance.
The only apparent reason to have both occur at the same
time was the prosecutors' desire to prevent Gabbert from
communicating with his client.
-2 6
Gabbert filed an action in district court and contended that "his
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures and his Fourteenth Amendment right to practice his profes-
sion without unreasonable governmental interference were both vio-
lated." 27 The district court found that Zoeller and Oppenheim had
absolute immunity, and that Conn and Najera had qualified immu-
nity. As such, the court dismissed Gabbert's Fourth Amendment
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 802.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 798.
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claims.28 The district court also granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on Gabbert's Fourteenth Amendment claims for
the same reasons.29 Gabbert appealed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and allowed Gabbert to
assert the Fourth Amendment claims against Conn and Zoeller and
the Fourteenth Amendment claims against Conn and Naera.30 The
case was remanded to the district court.
31
During oral argument, Judges Harry Pregerson, Michael Daly
Hawkins, and Charles R. Weiner32 rejected the state's argument that
the prosecution only took advantage of a legitimate technique to en-
courage Baker to testify truthfully.33 Baker was told that she was the
target34 of a perjury investigation.35 When the prosecution prevented
her from speaking with her attorney, they did not do so to "encour-
age her to reveal the information ' 36 but rather to "encourage her to
incriminate herself.
37
Gabbert v. Conn raises important questions about limits on
prosecutorial conduct in grand jury investigations and a grand jury
witness's right to consult with her lawyer during her testimony. The
issue can be approached two ways. The Supreme Court has framed
28. See id.
29. See id. at 799.
30. See id. at 806.
31. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 199 S. Ct. 39 (1998), and oral
argument took place on February 23, 1999. See Kenneth Jost, Lawyer Search
Bemuses Court, RECORDER, Feb. 24, 1999, at 1.
32. Judges Pregerson and Hawkins are judges of the Ninth Circuit. Judge
Weiner is a Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and
sat by designation. See id. at 797 n.*.
33. Audio tape of Oral Argument, supra note 1.
34. An individual may be either a "target" of the investigation, or a "non-
target"--otherwise known as a "mere witness"--when called before the grand
jury. A target witness is "a person as to whom the prosecutor or the Grand
Jury has substantial evidence linking him to the commission of a crime and
who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant." Jay Gold-
berg, Multiple Representation of White Collar Targets and Witnesses During
the Grand Jury Investigation, in WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PRACTICE 149,
152-53 (1985) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-
11.256 (1977)). A mere witness-or non-target-is someone whose "conduct
is within the scope of the investigation." Id. at 155 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, U.S. ATrORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-11.250 (1977)). A non-target, how-
ever, can become a target at any time during the grand jury investigation.
35. See Audio tape of Oral Argument, supra note 1.
36. Id. (statement of attorney Steven J. Renick).
37. Id. (statement of Judge Hawkins).
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the issue as whether "a prosecutor violate[s] an attorney's rights un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment by causing the attorney to be
searched at the time his client is testifying before a grand jury."
38
The issue may alternatively be framed as whether a grand jury wit-
ness has a right to consult with counsel in order to avoid self-
incrimination.39 This Comment takes the second approach.
The Supreme Court has not decided whether a grand jury wit-
ness has a right to consult with a lawyer during testimony in order to
avoid self-incrimination. 40 This Comment urges that, at a minimum,
grand jury witnesses be provided with the opportunity to consult on
Fifth Amendment issues. Witnesses should also be able to consult
on other topics. A lawyer can help a witness preserve privileges. A
lawyer can also help a witness understand and answer the grand
jury's questions. Moreover, a lawyer can provide a witness with the
moral support necessary to withstand the loneliness and stress arising
out of the grand jury's interrogation.
This Comment discusses grand jury witnesses' right to consult
with retained counsel.41 Part II discusses the history of the grand
jury, its English origins, and its role in America. Part III describes
how grand juries operate today. Part IV explains how the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies in grand jury
38. Conn v. Gabbert, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998). The Court concluded "that such
conduct by a prosecutor does not violate an attorney's Fourteenth Amendment
right to practice his profession." Conn v. Gabbert, No. 97-1802, 1999 WL
181181, at *3.
39. In Gabbert, the Supreme Court did not face the issue whether Baker
had a right to consult with counsel because Gabbert only asserted his right to
practice law and not her right to consult with her attorney. 131 F.3d at 800.
Baker would likely not have had standing to assert her right to consult with
counsel because she did assert her right not to incriminate herself, and she was
not held in contempt. See id. at 798. As such, Baker would not have the "in-
jury in fact" required for standing. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162
(1997). Had Baker been held in contempt, she could have asserted her right to
consult with counsel in California State Court on appeal from the contempt or-
der. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 1ST APP. DIST. INTERNAL OPERATING PRACTICE &
P. § 36.
40. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
8.15(a), at 453 (2d ed. 1992).
41. A related issue exists as to whether a target witness has the right to ap-
ointed counsel for the purpose of consultation outside the grand jury room,
ut that discussion is beyond the scope of this article. For a summary of the
issues and argument in favor of appointed counsel, see United States v. Man-
dujano, 425 U.S. 564, 602-09 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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proceedings, and why the privilege includes the right to consult with
an attorney. Part V examines three current grand jury models that
recognize a witness's need to consult counsel, and provide the wit-
ness with such an opportunity. Part VI concludes that a witness in a
grand jury proceeding should have the right to consult with counsel
during an appearance.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE GRAND JURY
The Frankish, Scandinavian, and Roman civilizations all used
bodies that resembled a modem grand jury.42 It is generally con-
ceded that the modem grand jury is derived from the body that Henry
II instituted as part of the English judiciary during the mid-twelfth
century.43 Henry II sought not "to protect the innocent from unjust
prosecution,"" but rather to augment the judicial power of the mon-
archy at the expense of the church and the barons.4 5 Henry H's pur-
pose contrasts with the protective reasons for which the grand jury
was implemented in America.46
A. The Grand Jury in England
Henry II discovered two important aspects of ecclesiastical
power in England shortly after his ascension to the throne. The first
was that previous English monarchs had given considerable jurisdic-
tion to the ecclesiastical courts. 4 7 The second was that the ecclesias-
tical courts were earning a huge profit from the fines they levied.48
Ecclesiastical courts had broad jurisdiction. They declared the
law of wills, marriages, and property inheritance.4 9 They also ruled
on any criminal charges brought against clergy.50 The latter power
was particularly significant because clerks and various members of
ecclesiastical orders could commit serious offenses, such as murder,
42. See Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the
Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 701, 703 (1972); LEROY D. CLARK, THE
GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 7 (1975).
43. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 7; Schwartz, supra note 42, at 703.
44. CLARK, supra note 42, at 7.
45. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 703-04.
46. See id. at 701.
47. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 7.
48. See id. at8.
49. See id. at 7-8.
50. See id. at 8.
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and then claim "the benefit of clergy." 51 Clergy defendants tried be-
fore the ecclesiastical courts could suffer a punishment as light as the
loss of their position.
52
Henry II was irked that the church received such substantial
revenues from the fines its courts levied-revenues so high that the
"archdeacon's courts . . . levied every year by their fines more
money than the whole revenue of the crown." 53 Henry II saw no rea-
son to leave so much money and power with the church, and made
two agreements that brought the church's money and power under
his control.
The first agreement was the 1164 Constitutions of Clarendon.
54
This agreement forced the church to recognize rights that Henry II
claimed were the traditional rights of kings-including the right to
have state officers arrest clergy, and the right to have the state accuse
and punish them.55 Because civilians were within the jurisdiction of
the ecclesiastical courts, Henry II also addressed the way his lay
subjects were accused.5 6 Before the Constitutions of Clarendon, in-
dividuals would speak privately with the bishop to accuse laymen of
crimes. 57 The Constitutions required either an individual or a jury to
publicly accuse civilians.
58
51. See id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 42, at 704 (stating that "[i]n the
first eight years of Henry's reign, more than one hundred murders had been
committed by clerks and members of various ecclesiastical orders.").
52. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 8.
53. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 704 (citing Alice Stopford Green, The Cen-
tralization of Norman Justice under Henry I, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 127 (1907)).
54. See id. at 705.
55. See id. at 706. This provision can be found in Chapter 3 of the Consti-
tutions of Clarendon. See id.
56. The ecclesiastical courts had wide powers over the laity:
To them alone belonged the right to enforce spiritual penalties, to deal
with cases of oaths, promises, anything in which a man's faith was
pledged; to decide as to the property of intestates to pronounce in
every case of inheritance whether the heir was legitimate, to declare
the law as to wills and marriage ....
Id. at 705 (citing Green, supra note 53, at 127-28).
57. See id. at 707. This provision can be found in Chapter 6 of the Consti-
tutions. See id. at 706.
58. See id. at 707.
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Henry II's second agreement, the Assize of Clarendon, is most
often credited with being the precursor to the modem grand jury.59
The Assize of Clarendon was issued in 1166, and it wrested criminal
jurisdiction from the barons.60 Before 1166, an injured party could
privately charge a lay subject before a baronial court.61 To be found
"innocent," the subject would either have to find eleven people to
swear to his innocence or survive a trial-by either battle or ordeal.62
Under the Assize, the injured party would present evidence to sixteen
men who would then decide whether or not to indict the suspect.
63
Once accused, the individual would face trial by ordeal.64 He no
longer had the option of finding eleven men to swear his innocence.
65
The panel of sixteen men was essentially the king's citizen police
force. Each juror was expected to accuse suspects and present crimi-
nals to the panel.66 Failure to perform either of these duties resulted
59. See id.
60. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 8.
61. See id.
62. See id. What constituted trial by ordeal is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, but it is interesting to note how guilt was determined in the twelfth cen-
tury. Trial by ordeal had been described as "a harrowing process offering
slender chance of vindication." MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS,
THE GRAND JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 7 (1977). The four species of
ordeal include: cold water, hot water, hot iron, and morsel-all of which re-
quired solemn religious ceremonies before the ordeal itself. In ordeal by cold
water, the accused was stripped, sprinkled with holy water, and thrown into the
deep-an innocent man would sink, and a guilty man would swim. Hot water
required that the accused's hand be plunged into boiling water from which he
had to retrieve a stone that had been suspended by a cord-the more serious
the crime, the deeper the stone was. The accused's hand was then bandaged
for three days-removal of the bandage would show either an innocent man's
healed wound, or a guilty man's festering wound. The same was true for the
ordeal by hot iron-where the accused received the hot iron in his naked hand
and then had to carry it nine feet before dropping it. Ordeal by morsel in-
volved the accused swallowing a one ounce piece of cheese or bread-an in-
nocent man would swallow it without a problem, whereas a guilty man would
choke on it. See id. at 7-8 (citing MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW, PH.D.,
HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 325-26 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1972)
(1880)).
63. See id.
64. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 8.
65. See id. He also was forced to endure ordeal by cold water-which
would almost certainly kill him-because it was presumed from the presenta-
tion that he was generally thought guilty in the neighborhood. See Schwartz,
supra note 42, at 708.
66. Schwartz, supra note 42, at 709. Grand jurors were expected to keep
money flowing into Henry's treasury in order to fund wars. See id.
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in heavy-if not "ruinous" 67--juror fines.6" To prevent potential ju-
rors from shirking their responsibility to the king, they were also
fined for failing to respond to a summons to serve on a panel. 69 Be-
cause of these burdens, Henry II's subjects deeply feared being
called for grand jury duty.7 °
Henry II's grand jury did not protect the people and was not in-
tended to. Rather, Henry II's goals for the grand jury were to raise
state revenues and render the baronial and ecclesiastical courts pow-
erless. 71 The idea that the grand jury could function in a way to pro-
tect individuals against "unfounded charges and oppressive govern-
ment"' 72 appeared in 1681-more than five hundred years after the
Assize of Clarendon.
73
At that time, Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, and Stephen Col-
ledge were "vocal Protestant opponents of King Charles l's attempt
to re-establish the Catholic Church in England."74 As such, the King
and his royal prosecutors wanted the grand jury to indict both Col-
ledge and Shaftesbury for high treason. The King demanded a pub-
licly held grand jury proceeding.75 The panel of jurors resisted a
public proceeding and questioned witnesses in private-without the
presence of prosecutors. 76 They refused to indict after hearing the
evidence.77 The Colledge and Shaftesbury cases have been hailed as
67. Id.
68. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 9.
69. See id.
70. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 709-10.
71. See id. at 710.
72. FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 64, at 9.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id. During the intervening years, trial by ordeal was abolished as
the process of trial by jury was developed. The grand jury indicted an accused,
and a separate jury would try the accused. The judges' past practice of interro-
gating the accusing jury as to the reasons for indictment or acquittal became
useless because it made more sense to question the trial jurors. The grand jury
became an institution cloaked in secrecy, whose findings were independent and
free from the courts' control. See GEORGE J. EDWARDS, The Grand Jury, in
FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27-28 (1973).
76. In the seventeenth century, the grand jury was a "private proceeding[s]"
that did not include the prosecutor. See Schwartz, supra note 42, at 715. To-
day the prosecutor is an integral part of a grand jury proceeding. See id.
77. See FRANKEL & NAFTALIS, supra note 64, at 9.
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"marking the grand jury's initial assertion of its role as a shield for
the innocent against malicious and oppressive prosecution."
78
B. The Grand Jury in America
The first formal grand jury in America was established in 1635
in Massachusetts. 79 Within forty-eight years, some form of the grand
jury operated in all of the colonies. 80 It became an "indispensable
part" of each Colonial government.81 The original role of the colo-
nial grand jury was to return indictments and presentments. Pre-
sentments required the grand jury to initiate an investigation, rather
than to simply respond to a prosecutor's charges. Jurors were
drawn from the local area and had firsthand knowledge of both the
alleged offender and the particular offense.
8 3
The grand jury in America developed beyond its indictment and
presentment functions and adopted quasi-legislative and civil watch-
dog functions as well.84 Grand juries were known to influence leg-
islation and in some cases to enact ordinances directly. 5 Grand ju-
ries inspected, investigated, and lodged complaints. "[T]hey
inspected bridges, public buildings, and jails, and then issued reports
critical of 8public officials for failure to construct or operate them
properly."8  Grand jury action in all of these areas of early American
life greatly enhanced the grand jury's reputation.
Perhaps the greatest boost to the grand jury's reputation as the
protector of the people came during the pre-Revolutionary and
78. Id. Unfortunately, all did not end well for Shaftesbury and Colledge.
The King presented the case to a different grand jury, who returned an indict-
ment. Colledge was convicted and executed; Shaftesbury fled to Holland and
remained there until his death. See id. at 10.
79. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 13.
80. See id.
81. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND
"PROBABLE CAUSE" 86 (1991).
82. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 13. The conditions of colonial America-
no police force and undeveloped prosecutorial functions-meant that present-
ments were common. See id. at 13-14.
83. See id. at 14.
84. See id.
85. See id. "In 1862 in the Carolinas, for example, legislation was promptly
considered if it was suggested by a majority of the county grand juries. In a
colony like New York, which had no representative assembly, the grand jury
actually assumed direct ordinance-making powers." Id.
86. Id.
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Revolutionary War periods. 87 Before the Revolution, colonists re-
fused to return indictments in an attempt to blunt Royalist power to
prosecute those who opposed British authority.88 As tension between
the Colonies and England increased, juries returned treason indict-
ments against colonists sympathetic to the Crown.89  The grand
jury's reputation as protector of the people grew stronger when a
grand jury refused to indict the editors of the Boston Gazette for li-
beling the Royalist governor in 1768. Its reputation was sealed when
a grand jury twice refused to indict John Peter Zenger for seditious
libel of the Royal Governor of New York.90
The grand jury was held in such high esteem that it was included
in many state constitutions. It was also included in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution: "No person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger. ,91
III. THE ROLE OF THE GRAND JURY TODAY
The grand jury has been both lauded and condemned over the
years. It has been praised "as the 'security of... lives,' the con-
server of... liberties, and the noblest check upon the malice and op-
pression of individuals and states." 92 It has also been "bitterly as-
sailed as 'purely mischievous' and a 'relic of barbarism.'
93
Regardless of the criticism that the grand jury has sustained, the
Fifth Amendment guarantees the federal right to indictment by the
grand jury-a grand jury whose historical function has been both as
a "'sword and a shield.' 94 All fifty states have developed grand jury
87. See id. at 17.
88. See id. at 16. Often, the grand jury did not protect "innocent" people
against arbitrary prosecution-it protected individuals who had clearly violated
British law by failing to indict them. See id. at 17-18.
89. See id. at 17.
90. See id. at 18.
91. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
92. EDWARDS, supra note 75, at 1 (citation omitted).
93. Id. (citation omitted).
94. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 1 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2D §
101, at 196 (1982) (citing In re Grand Jury January, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D.
Md. 1970)). The grand jury acts as a sword when it indicts, and as a shield
917April 1999]
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systems, even though the Constitution does not require them to use
them.95 Some state grand juries operate the same way as the federal
grand jury, while others have changed the federal model.
A. The Federal Grand Jury
According to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6, a grand jury
may have no fewer than sixteen, and no more than twenty-three
members.96 Its proceedings are conducted with the utmost secrecy.
Without court approval, evidence heard before the grand jury may
only be revealed to federal prosecutors, their assistants, and other
federal grand juries.97 This secrecy requirement has led to limits on
the number of people who may attend grand jury proceedings. The
prosecutor, grand jurors, the testifying witness, an interpreter when
needed, and stenographer or recording device operator are the only
people permitted in the grand jury room. 98 Federal grand juries hold
regular sessions, but each district determines how frequently the ju-
rors convene.99 A jury will meet less often if the local prosecutor has
no need for its assistance. 100 Large urban districts may have several
grand juries in session every single day. 10 1 Once in session, the
grand jury operates unconstrained by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. °2 Exclusionary rules also do not apply in the grand jury
when it refuses to do so.
95. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
96. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. Courts have interpreted this to mean that a
grand jury cannot meet with fewer than sixteen jurors. See Susan W. Brenner,
The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 67, 82 (1995).
97. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 86-87. The secrecy requirement of Rule
6(e) is not imposed on witnesses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) advisory com-
mittee's note.
98. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(d).
99. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 81.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 83. The implications of this exemption are broad-the grand
jury may indict based entirely on hearsay that would be inadmissible in a trial.
But the grand jury is constrained by the law governing privileges. See id. at
83-84.
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setting. 103 Finally, federal prosecutors need not present the grand
jury with any exculpatory evidence.
1 0 4
Professor Susan Brenner has criticized the federal grand jury as
having "become little more than a rubber stamp, indiscriminately
authorizing prosecutorial decisions."'1 5 Federal grand juries have
become relatively passive because of prosecutors' dominance over
grand jury proceedings. To begin with, federal grand jurors rely on
prosecutors to explain the law and then help them to apply it.
1 0 6
Many federal criminal cases are legally and factually complex, and
the prosecutor is the only person available who can help the jurors
make sense of the case. 107 In addition, prosecutors have learned how
to create a rapport with the jurors. Because of this rapport, jurors are
more likely to identify with the prosecutor and return indictments.
10 8
Finally, the grand jury no longer has the ability to bring charges on
its own initiative: "[G]rand jurors cannot return charges in the form
of an indictment without a prosecutor's consent." 0 9 As a result of
these three developments, the federal grand jury has lost much of the
authority, influence, and independence grand juries enjoyed in early
America."
0
In response to these problems, there have been attempts to re-
form the operation of federal grand juries over the last twenty
years."' In this time, two noteworthy bills have been proposed to
Congress: The Grand Jury Reform Act of 1985,112 and the Assis-
tance of Counsel Before Grand Juries Act of 1987.113 Both acts were
based on the American Bar Association's Model Grand Jury Act."
4
103. See id. at 84. This means that the grand jury has the opportunity to con-
sider evidence that was obtained during an illegal search or through an illegal
seizure.
104. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 55 (1992).
105. Brenner, supra note 96, at 67.
106. See id. at 72.
107. See id. at 73.
108. See id.
109. Id. (citing United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72 (5th Cir. 1965)).
110. See id.
111. See Frank 0. Bowman, III., A Bludgeon By Any Other Name: The Mis-
use of "Ethical Rules" against Prosecutors to Control the Law of the State, 9
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 665, 679-81 (1996).
112. H.R. 1407, 99th Cong. (1985).
113. H.R. 2515, 100th Cong. (1987).
114. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A.B.A. GRAND JURY POLICY AND
MODEL ACT (1977-82), at 16-19 (2d ed. 1982). The ABA advocates such re-
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In order to "help to ensure the proper functioning of the grand
jury,' 15 The Grand Jury Reform Act of 1985 included:
[T]he right to counsel inside the grand jury room for grand
jury witnesses; the right not to be indicted on evidence
which is inadmissible at trial; the right of a witness not to be
prosecuted on a charge arising from transactions about
which he is forced to testify upon a grant of immunity; the
requirement that prosecutors present exculpatory evidence
as well as evidence that indicates guilt; the requirement that
prosecutors inform witnesses, whether they are targets of
investigation, the nature of the crime under investigation,
and the laws applicable to the investigation; a limitation on
confinement for contempt of the grand jury to not more than
12 months." 6
The bill was referred to the House Judiciary Committee and never
made it out.
117
The proposed Assistance of Counsel Before Grand Juries Act of
1987 was much narrower than the 1985 bill but ultimately suffered
the same fate. 118 The bill gave witnesses the right to have counsel
present; it limited counsel's participation in and disclosure of pro-
ceedings; it permitted the representation of more than one witness;
and it provided sanctions against attorneys who failed to abide by the
bill's provisions. 119 Hearings were held, but the 1987 bill also died
in committee.
forms as preventing introduction of illegally obtained evidence against a target
witness; requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence; providing wit-
nesses the right to be accompanied by counsel in the grand jury room; and re-
quiring prosecutors to read witnesses their rights before witnesses begin to tes-
tify. See id.
115. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 1407 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 2 (1985)
[hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1407] (statement of Rep. Conyers, chairman of
the subcommittee).
116. Id. (statement of Rep. Conyers, chairman of the subcommittee).
117. For the history of H.R. 1407, see 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,016 (Dec.
10, 1986).
118. For the history of H.R. 2515, see 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 35,044 (Dec.
12, 1988).
119. See Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 2515 Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2-3
(1987) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2515] (text of the bill).
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The American Bar Association, defense attorneys, and a profes-
sor of law120 supported the bills, but neither bill was able to over-
come strong opposition from the Department of Justice.' 2 1 The De-
partment of Justice argued that the grand jury needed no reform, that
it was a historic success, and that reform could only eviscerate the
grand jury's independence and inquisitorial nature. 122 The fate of
both bills demonstrates how easily opponents to change can rely on
history and traditions to avoid reforms that merit serious considera-
tion.
B. State Grand Juries
Some state grand juries mirror the federal grand jury. In those
that do not, witnesses are generally afforded more rights than wit-
nesses before federal grand juries.
State grand juries vary in size. They may have as few as
five 124 and as many as twenty-three 125 jurors. Like the federal grand
jury, all state grand jury proceedings are conducted in secret.126 It is
largely unclear how often state grand juries convene because of the
"informality surrounding the state grand jury process."'1 7 There is
some indication that state grand juries are called in and meet on an
120. See id. at 42-53 (statement of Peter F. Vaira, Esq., on behalf of the
American Bar Association); id. at 57-69 (statement of Michael D. Ross, Esq.,
on behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); Hearings
on H.R. 1407, supra note 115, at 26-54 (statement of George J. Moscarino,
Chairperson, Grand Jury Committee, Criminal Justice Section, and William W.
Greenhalgh, Former Chairperson Criminal Justice Section, on behalf of the
American Bar Association); Hearings on H.R. 1407, supra note 115, at 131-47
(statement of Prof. Peter L. Arenella).
121. See Hearings on H.P, 2515, supra note 119, at 11-20 (statement of Joe
D. Whitley, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice); Hearings on H.P 1407, supra note 115, at 178-
96 (statement of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
122. See Hearings on H.P, 2515, supra note 119, at 6-10 (statement of Joe
D. Whitley, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice); Hearings on H.R. 1407, supra note 115, at 166-
96 (statement of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
123. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 78.
124. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-19.5 (Michie 1995).
125. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-11-1, 12-11.1-1 (1994).
126. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 86 n.98.
127. Id. at 81-82.
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"'as needed basis."",128 As in the federal system, state prosecutors
play a key role in the grand jury-they act both as grand juries' legal
advisors and as advocates for the state by presenting evidence and
submitting indictments.1
29
Despite these similarities among state grand jury systems, there
are also important differences. Not all states use the same eviden-
tiary rules in grand jury proceedings. Most states, like the federal
grand jury, "impose few, if any, evidentiary restraints on grand jury
proceedings .... ,130 Most states also allow their grand juries to con-
sider evidence that was illegally searched for or seized. 13 1 Some
states, however, do not require the prosecution to present evidence
that would exculpate the accused. 32 Some states do apply certain
128. Id. at 82 & n.83 (citation omitted).
129. See id. at 92.
130. Id. at 83-84 & n.89. See, eg., ALA. R. CRIM. P. 12.8(f)(1) ("For pur-
poses of this section, legal evidence may consist of hearsay evidence in whole
or in part."); OFHO R. EVID. 101(c)(2) ("These rules... do not apply in...
[p]roceedings before grand juries."); People v. Wilson, 647 N.E.2d 910, 921
(Ill. 1994) ("[P]rivilege and relevance ... are not relevant at the grand jury
stage.., since the rules of evidence do not apply."); People v. Hoffian, 518
N.W.2d 817, 828 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] grand jury... is not constrained
by the rules of evidence and may consider all sources of evidence .... "); see
also Pitts v. Superior Court, 862 P.2d 894, 895 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he
rules of evidence do not apply in grand jury proceedings."), vacated sub nom,
Pitts v. Adams, 876 P.2d 1143 (Ariz. 1994) (en banc); People v. Gable, 647
P.2d 246, 252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) ("[H]earsay... is admissible and may
well be the bulk of evidence offered to the grand jury ... ."); Anderson v.
State, 365 S.E.2d 421, 426 (Ga. 1988) ("[T]he evidence which the grand jury
receives . . . is not subject to inquiry as to admissibility . . . ."); State v.
O'Daniel, 616 P.2d 1383, 1388 n.3 (Haw. 1980) (allowing hearsay to be ad-
mitted, but suggesting that "[u]se of hearsay should be kept to a minimum");
Commonwealth v. Pina, 549 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Mass. 1990) (permitting use of
hearsay before grand jury); State v. Price, 260 A.2d 877, 879 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1970) ("[G]rand jury is permitted to both hear and act upon hearsay
evidence or even evidence unconstitutionally obtained by the police."); Henni-
gan v. State, 746 P.2d 360, 369 (Wyo. 1987) (stating that the use of hearsay in
grand jury proceedings is acceptable).
131. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 84 & n.92; see, e.g., People v. DeLaire,
610 N.E.2d 1277, 1283 (III. App. Ct. 1993) ("The exclusionary rule does not
bar a grand jury from considering evidence illegally obtained.... ."). Accord In
re a Special Investigation No. 227, 466 A.2d 48, 49-50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1983); Commonwealth v. Santaniello, 341 N.E.2d 259, 260-61 (Mass. 1976);
In re Mahler, 426 A.2d 1021, 1031 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 452 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); State
v. Dixon, 880 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); Alejandro v. State,
725 S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
132. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 85 & n.95; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §
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rules of evidence to grand jury proceedings, 133 and a few also apply
their own versions of the exclusionary rule.134 Some states even re-
quire prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence.
135
State grand juries also differ as to who may be present in the
grand jury room. All the states follow the federal model to the extent
that the grand jurors, prosecutor, and an interpreter if necessary, are
permitted in the room, but many states also permit a law enforcement
officer's presence to "ensure security when a witness is testify-
ing."'136 More than a dozen states allow for the presence of witness
16-85-511 (Michie 1987); IDAHO CODE § 19-1106 (1997); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 442 (West 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 172.145(1) (Mi-
chie 1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-10.1-27 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
132.320(6) (Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-5-15 (Michie
1998); People v. Beu, 644 N.E.2d 27, 30 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) ("[P]rosecutor has
no duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.").
133. See Brenner, supra note 96, 84-85 & n.93. The most commonly applied
rule of evidence is one that "prohibit[s] prosecutors from presenting inadmissi-
ble hearsay in grand jury proceedings." See id. at 83 & n.88; see, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-85-511 ("The grand jury can receive none but legal evi-
dence."). Other statutes reflect this rule. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.6 (West
Supp. 1999) ("[T]he grand jury shall not receive any evidence except that
which would be admissible over an objection at the trial of a criminal action..
."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1105 (Michie 1997) (the grand jury may receive
legally admissible hearsay); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 442 ("[T]he
grand jury should receive only legal evidence .... "); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-
11-314 (1997) ("[T]he grand jury shall receive no other evidence.., than...
that furnished by legal evidence . . . ."); see also NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §
172.135 (Michie 1997) (hearsay is inadmissible evidence for grand jury pro-
ceedings); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-10 (Michie 1978) ("Before the grand jury
may vote an indictment charging an offense.., it must be satisfied from the
lawful evidence before it that an offense.., has been committed .... "); N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.30(1) (McKinney 1993) ("Except as otherwise pro-
vided ... [the] rules of evidence ... [are] applicable to grand jury proceed-
ings."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-5-15 ("The rules of evidence shall
apply to proceedings before the grand jury."). Utah allows hearsay if it would
be allowed at preliminary hearings. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-13(5)(a)
(Supp. 1998).
134. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 84 & n.93; CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.6
(West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting the grand jury from receiving "any evidence
except which would be admissible over objection at the trial of a criminal ac-
tion .... ).
135. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 85 & n.96; see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
939.71 (West Supp. 1999) (requiring the prosecutor to "inform the grand jury
of the nature and existence" of exculpatory evidence).
136. Brenner, supra note 96, at 89 & n.1 10.
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counsel in the grand jury room,137 and Hawaii even provides for the
appointment and presence of the grand jury's own independent coun-
sel.'
38
Finally, not all states have retained the indicting grand jury. 39
Connecticut and Pennsylvania abolished the indicting grand jury by
137. See LA FAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 8.15(b), at 455; see also ARIZ.
R. CRIM. P. 12.6 (persons under investigation are allowed presence of counsel
while they testify); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.2(b) (any witness is allowed assis-
tance of counsel during questioning); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-47f(d)
(West 1994) (any witness is allowed assistance of counsel during questioning);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.17(2) (West 1996) (a witness may have one attorney
present during questioning but not as a matter of right); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/112-4.1 (West 1992) (witnesses have the right to be accompanied by
counsel during questioning, but counsel may only advise witnesses of their
rights); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-34-2-5.5 (Michie 1998) (a target is entitled to the
assistance of an attorney); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3009 (1995) (any witness is
allowed to have counsel present during questioning, counsel may make objec-
tions, and the court will appoint counsel for those unable to afford their own);
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 433 (West Supp. 1999) (persons under in-
vestigation may be accompanied by counsel during questioning); MASS. R.
CRIM. P. 5(c) (any witness may have counsel present during questioning);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.959(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (any witness who
has been granted immunity is entitled to the presence of counsel during ques-
tioning); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-1411(2) (Michie 1995) (any witness is
entitled to assistance of counsel during questioning); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
172.239 (Michie 1997) (persons under investigation are entitled to assistance
of counsel during questioning); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-4 (Michie 1998)
(persons under investigation are permitted the presence of counsel during
questioning); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.52 (McKinney 1993) (any witness
who has waived immunity has the right to be accompanied by counsel, and the
court will provide counsel to parties who cannot afford their own); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 340 (West 1992) (any witness is entitled to the presence
of one attorney during questioning); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4549(c)
(West 1981) (witnesses may have counsel present, and counsel will be ap-
pointed for those unable to afford their own); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-5-11
(Michie 1998) (any witness may have the presence of counsel during ques-
tioning); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-12-216 (1997) (any witness may leave the
grand jury room for consultations with counsel); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-
13 (Sup. 1998) (any witness has the right to be represented by counsel and to
be advised of this right); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.27.120 (West 1990)
(any witness may be accompanied by counsel unless given immunity and mustbe advised of the right; witnesses testifying under immunity may still leave the
grand jury room during questioning to consult with an attorney); WlSC. STAT.ANN. § 968.45 (West 1998) (any witness appearing before the grand jury may
have counsel present).
138. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 94-95 & nn.127-30.
139. Forty-eight states have retained the indicting grand jury. See id. at 101-
02.
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constitutional amendment, 140 but all fifty states have retained the in-
vestigative grand jury.141
The investigative grand jury can be classified in one of two
ways: 142 (1) grand juries that "investigate only the criminal activity
identified and submitted to them by a prosecutor or by a court," 143 or
(2) those that "investigate any activity that violated the criminal laws
of their state and occurred within their venue."'144 Grand juries in the
first category have little more than a passive role. "Rather than
launching their own inquiries, they merely determine whether prob-
able cause exists to support charges for criminal activity brought to
their attention by a prosecutor or a judge.' 145 The second category
allows for more grand jury investigation. Several of the states that
have grand juries of the second category either permit or require
grand jurors to report any personal knowledge of criminal activity to
the grand jury for further investigation.146 Despite the differences
among grand jury systems, it is clear that the grand jury, as an insti-
tution, is largely controlled by prosecutors. Nonetheless, courts still
view the grand jury as both "'a sword and a shield."",147 The Su-
preme Court recently stated that "the whole theory of [the grand
jury's] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional
Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Gov-
ernment and the people."'148 It is impossible to reconcile these gran-
diose characterizations with a federal grand jury, which is powerless
to perform investigations without the court's aid and is unable to re-
turn an indictment without the prosecutor's consent.
149
140. See id. at 102 & n.157.
141. See id. at 102-03. The overwhelming majority of states have kept the
indicting grand jury presumably because they have decided that the institution
plays an important role in the criminal justice system. See id.
142. Professor Brenner creates a third category, "state analogues to the spe-
cial federal grand jury," discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. See id. at 110-11.
143. Id. at 110.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 112.
146. See id. at 113-14&n.195.
147. WRIGHT, supra note 94, § 101, at 196 (quoting In re Grand Jury Janu-
ary, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970)).
.148. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
149. See WRIGHT, supra note 94, § 101, at 199-202 (discussing how the
grand jury's independence "should not be overstated.").
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IV. RIGHT TO CONSULT COUNSEL AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Gabbert v. Conn150 demonstrates that grand jury proceedings are
not the independent proceedings history suggests they ought to be.
Rather, they are orchestrated by and subject to the prosecution's bi-
ases. Witnesses before the grand jury have long enjoyed the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. But this privilege can be truncated if
prosecutors are allowed to prevent witnesses from consulting with
their attorneys. Grand jury witnesses' right to not incriminate them-
selves will be undermined if the right does not include the right to
consult an attorney about invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.
A. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Applies in Grand Jury Proceedings
More than one hundred years ago, in Counselman v. Hitch-
cock,'5 ' the Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination privilege applies in grand jury proceedings.1
5 2
The grand jury in Counselman was investigating railroad companies
alleged to have violated an interstate commerce act.' Charles
Counselman appeared before the grand jury and "decline[d] to an-
swer" questions relating to grain transportation rates "on the ground
that [his answers] might tend to criminate [him]. 15 4 The questions
related to whether he obtained grain transportation rates that were
less than the tariff or open rate. 15 After Counselman invoked the
privilege, the grand jury reported the questions that Counselman had
refused to answer to the judge.156 The judge ordered Counselman to
show cause for why he should not answer the questions.'57 After a
hearing, the judge found his reasons "wholly insufficient." 58 Coun-
selman was called before the grand jury again, and he still refused to
150. 131 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 119 S. Ct. 39 (1998).
151. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
152. See id. at 563.
153. See id. at 548.
154. Id. at 549.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 550.
157. See id.
158. Id.
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answer the questions. 159  In a subsequent hearing, the court held
Counselman in contempt, fined him $500, and placed him in cus-
tody.
160
One of the first questions the Court resolved in Counselman was
whether the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege was avail-
able in grand jury proceedings. The Court considered the purpose
behind the privilege, as well as the meaning of the words "criminal
case," 161 and determined that the privilege must extend to grand jury
proceedings:
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional provi-
sion can only be, that a person shall not be compelled to be
a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution against
himself. It would doubtless cover such cases; but it is not
limited to them. The object was to insure that a person
should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any
investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show
that he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is
limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief
against which it seeks to guard.
162
About fifty years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the appli-
cation of the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege to grand
jury proceedings. 163 The Court stated that the privilege's protection
must be invoked, or else it is waived forever as to the answers given:
"An investigation by a grand jury is a criminal case. The Amend-
ment speaks of compulsion. It does not preclude a witness from tes-
tifying voluntarily in matters which may, incriminate him. If,
therefore, he desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim
it ... ."164 Therefore, while there is no general right to avoid the
grand jury's questions,16 5 a witness can claim the privilege against
self-incrimination.
166
159. See id.
160. See id. at 552.
161. Id. at 563.
162. Id. at 562.
163. See United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943) (citing Counsel-
man, 142 U.S. at 562 (1892)).
164. Id. (footnote omitted).
165. See In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931) (stating that "[a] wit-
ness is not entitled to be furnished with facilities for evading issues or con-
cealing true facts."); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345
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B. Counsel's Advice Gives Meaning to the Self-Incrimination
Privilege
Witnesses before a grand jury may not know, and therefore must
figure out when and how to claim the privilege against self-
incrimination. This is a daunting task for lay witnesses or anyone
who might find the grand jury proceeding somewhat strange, inva-
sive, or unsettling. Witnesses may not only be unclear about what is
incriminating, they may also be reluctant to assert the privilege in a
room dominated by grand jurors and the prosecution. As such, the
advice of counsel is critical in preserving and defining the witness's
privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court has not de-
cided whether the Fifth Amendment carries with it the right of a
grand jury witness to consult with counsel regarding the privilege,
167
but cases support the conclusion that the Fifth Amendment does
carry such a right.
United States v. Mandujano168 is perhaps the most important
case to consider when analyzing whether a grand jury witness has the
right to consult with counsel regarding the privilege against self-
incrimination. Roy Mandujano was called before the grand jury to
(1974) (stating that the witness also cannot invoke the protection simply out of
privacy interests).
166. The privilege cannot be asserted to protect others from possible crimi-
nal prosecution. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951).
167. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 8.15(a), at 453-54. Lower courts
have suggested that there is no constitutional right to even consult with counsel
outside the grand jury room, but this conclusion is based on a Sixth Amend-ment right to counsel analysis. See id. at 454.
168. 425 U.S. 564 (1976). In a plurality opinion, the Court stated that wit-
nesses need not receive Miranda warnings before answering a grand jury's
questions. See id. at 580-81. But in his opinion for the Court i Miranda,
Chief Justice Warren wrote that "the Fifth Amendment privilege is available
outside of criminal court proceedings." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467
(1966). The Court in Miranda recognized that the purpose of the privilege was
"to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom.., is [significantly]
curtailed... from being compelled to incriminate themselves." Id. The Court
stated that "without proper safeguards the process of in custody interrogation
of persons suspected.., of crime.., contains inherently compelling pressures
... which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id. The Court concluded
that "[i]n order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to
exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be ade-
quately and effectively apprised of his rights .... ." Id. One wonders why the
same rights are not afforded a witness-target or otherwise-who is compelled
by subpoena to testify before a grand jury, and who, like an individual in po-
lice custody, is not free to leave.
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testify in a narcotics investigation. 169 After a few preliminary state-
ments, the prosecutor asked Mandujano if he had contacted a law-
yer.170 Mandujano responded that he had not contacted one because
he did not have the money to do so.171 The prosecutor then made the
following offer:
Well, if you would like to have a lawyer, he cannot be in-
side this room. He can only be outside. You would be free
to consult with him if you so chose. Now, if during the
course of this investigation, the questions that we ask you, if
you feel like you would like to have a lawyer outside to talk
to, let me know.
172
The plurality opinion of four justices confirmed the prosecutor's
statement as a correct recital of law, but stated that "[a] witness 'be-
fore a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of constitutional right, on
being represented by his counsel."",173 The plurality then stated that
it was settled law that witnesses may not insist on their attorney's
presence in the grand jury room. 174 These statements are confusing
when taken together. They lead to equally confusing characteriza-
tions of law and have led commentators to cite Mandujano for the
broad proposition that there is no right to counsel in the grand
jury. 75  But Justice Brennan's concurrence in Mandujano shows
why the case does not stand for this.
176
169. See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 567.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 567-68.
173. Id. at 581 (quoting In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957)).
174. See id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)).
175. Lower court opinions, such as In re Black, similarly state that "[n]either
at a trial nor before a grand jury is [the witness] entitled to have the aid of
counsel when testifying." 47 F.2d at 543. See also United States v. Blanton,
77 F. Supp. 812, 816-17 (E.D. Mo. 1948) (quoting In re Black). Commenta-
tors focus on the lack of a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Kaija Bla-
lock et al., Procedural Issues, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 883, 885 & n.17 (1997);
Max D. Stem & David A. Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Sub-
poena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1805 &
n.100 (1988); Abbe Smith, Book Review, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 651, 659 & n.54
(1989) (reviewing LISA J. MACINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE
PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE SHADOWS OF REPUTE (1987)).
176. See Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 603-04 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Justice Brennan pointed out that the plurality opinion mistakenly
relied on dicta in In re Groban177 for the proposition that there is no
constitutional right for a witness to be represented by counsel when
testifying before a grand jury.178 Groban did not even involve grand
jury activity. 179 Rather, Groban involved a Fire Marshal's investi-
gation where the Marshal excluded counsel from the proceeding pur-
suant to his statutory powers. 180 The Supreme Court nevertheless
attempted to analogize the grand jury to the Fire Marshal's adminis-
trative investigation, upholding the Fire Marshal's right to exclude
counsel. 181 Groban does not address the issue whether a grand jury
witness has a right to consult counsel.
The Supreme Court should therefore look to its other existing
precedent to answer this question. In his Mandujano concurrence,
18 2
Justice Brennan noted that in Maness v. Meyers,183 the Court stated
that counsel's advice is essential for a witness contemplating whether
to invoke the privilege:
The assertion of a testimonial privilege, as of many other
rights, often depends upon legal advice from someone who
is trained and skilled in the subject matter, and who may of-
fer a more objective opinion. A layman may not be aware
of the precise scope, the nuances, and boundaries of his
Fifth Amendment privilege. It is not a self-executing
mechanism; it can be affirmatively waived, or lost by not
asserting it in a timely fashion.1
8 4
That counsel has traditionally been absent from grand jury pro-
ceedings does not mean that the tradition is constitutionally sound.
Justice Brennan exposed the circular reasoning the Supreme Court
used to exclude counsel from the grand jury: "Ironically, the greatest
177. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
178. See id.
179. See id. at 332-33.
180. See id. at 331-32.
181. Seeid. at333.
182. See 425 U.S. at 604 (Brennan, J., concurring).
183. 419 U.S. 449 (1975). Maness involved a lawyer who was held in con-
tempt for advising his client to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. See id. at 450-56. The Supreme Court held that the lawyer
properly performed his duties in advising his client, and that he "cannot suffer
any penalty for performing such duties in good faith." Id. at 470.
184. Id. at 466 (footnote omitted).
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impediment to the development of the law concerning a grand jury
witness' right to some form of assistance of counsel has been reli-
ance upon the traditional absence of counsel in grand jury proceed-
ings for denial of assistance of counsel in administrative proceed-
ings.,,85
C. The Witness Should Be Able to Consult on Topics Other than the
Fifth Amendment Privilege
A witness needs counsel's guidance, especially in light of most
witnesses' lack of professional legal skill and understanding of the
self-incrimination privilege, and the Fifth Amendment's critical role
"as the bulwark against [prosecutorial] abuse."'186 There are three
key areas in which an attorney can help the grand jury process: (1)
preserving the witness's privileges; (2) providing the grand jury with
the answers it seeks; and (3) supporting the witness through a stress-
ful and lonely interrogation.
The privilege against self-incrimination is not the only privilege
held by a witness before the grand jury. The attorney-client privi-
lege, the confidential marital communications and spousal privileges,
and the privilege protecting patient and psychotherapist communica-
tions, among others, also apply. 187 Just as it is difficult for a witness
to determine when to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege, it is dif-
ficult for a witness to determine when to claim other privileges. The
witness needs the advice of counsel to avoid inadvertently waiving
any of these privileges.
Counsel also can help the witness provide the grand jury with
the information it seeks. It may be difficult for a witness to see the
broader issues the grand jury is attempting to resolve when asked
specific legal questions. But an attorney will see how a prosecutor's
questions build on each other and discern the significance of a wit-
ness's answers. For example, an attorney can suggest that a witness
answer narrowly if the issue the grand jury is broaching borders on
185. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 603 n.19 (Brennan, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 604 (Brennan, J., concurring).
187. See Elizabeth Silva & Rachel Spinogatti, Twenty-Seventh Annual Re-
view of Criminal Procedure: I Preliminary Proceedings, Grand Jury, 86
GEO. L.J. 1373, 1388-90 & nn.876-83 (1998).
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being privileged. Or, an attorney might suggest a longer, back-
ground-oriented explanation in order to show the grand jury "the big
picture"--those circumstances that explain the witness's behavior, or
perhaps even those that give rise to a defense. It is unlikely that a
witness would alone be able to make such important assessments
while under the grand jury's scrutiny.
Finally, the presence of counsel can help lower stress levels and
lessen the intense feelings of loneliness that a grand jury witness may
feel during interrogation. Picture going inside a "windowless jury
room, a stark, cheaply furnished square box ...not a friend in
sight,"188 where the proceeding is "intimidating, even terrifying, and
unlike any other proceeding known to the American judicial sys-
tem.''1 9 As one professor put it, "' [tiestifying before a grand jury is
a lot like a car crash .... Sometimes you need dental charts to iden-
tify your client after it's over." ' 190 Witnesses have described the ex-
perience as "lonely," "one-sided," "isolat[ing]," and "emotionally
overwhelm[ing]."' 19 This intense experience by no means becomes
easy for a witness who is permitted to consult with counsel outside
the grand jury. But testifying becomes exponentially more difficult
for the witness who cannot consult. Why make the experience
harder on a witness than it needs to be-a more relaxed witness will
probably give better testimony than one who is needlessly under
stress.
The presence of defense counsel in the grand jury room would
lessen a witness's anxiety, but admittedly would create concerns for
prosecutors. First, prosecutors worry that witness testimony will lose
much of its spontaneity if defense counsel is present. 192 A witness
might depend too much on the lawyer and "repeat or parrot re-
sponses discussed with the lawyer, rather than [I testify[ing] fully
and frankly in his or her own words."'193 Second, prosecutors worry
188. Tony Mauro & Kevin Johnson, Grand Jury 'Very Lonely' For Witness,
USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 1998, at 1A.
189. Id.
190. Id. (quoting George Washington University law professor Jonathan
Turley).
191. Id.
192. See Hearings on H.R 1407, supra note 115, at 183 (statement of James
I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assitant Attorney General, Criminal Division, United
States Department of Justice).
193. Id. (statement of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assitant Attorney General,
COUNSEL AND THE GRAND JURY
that defense counsel will disregard rules that limit counsel's partici-
pation and will "act... in a manner that will disrupt and delay the
grand jury's investigation." 194  Finally, prosecutors are concerned
that where an attorney represents multiple parties within one investi-
gation, a witnesses' testimony will be chilled and a legitimate inves-
tigation thwarted.195
D. Grand Jury Witnesses Have a Right to Consult Counsel
The Court in Mandujano was not presented with the issue
whether a witness has a right to consult with counsel who is present
and outside the grand jury room. Moreover, the Mandujano opinion
was by a plurality of four justices and as such does not have the force
of law. Therefore, the Supreme Court need not overturn Mandujano
to vindicate a grand jury witness's Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The Court need only reaffirm its previous
statement that assistance of counsel is vital to upholding the privi-
lege.
196
V. THREE GRAND JURY MODELS RECOGNIZE COUNSEL'S INTEGRAL
ROLE IN THE PROCEEDINGS
There are three distinct grand jury models in America today that
provide for counsel during the proceedings. They are considered in
turn, from the least to the most progressive. The "federal model"
permits the witness to exit the grand jury room to consult with an
attorney. The "state model" allows witness counsel inside the grand
jury room to advise the witness during the proceeding. The unique
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
194. Id. at 184 (statement of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assitant Attorney
General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
195. See id. at 186-88 (statement of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assitant At-
torney General, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice). If,
for example, an attorney represents an employer and an employee, the em-
ployee may be reluctant to testify about a matter concerning his employer be-
cause the employer will likely learn of the testimony through the attorney.
Also, an unscrupulous attorney could "advise witnesses on how to tailor their
responses in light of the testimony given by earlier witnesses ... [and] . .. se-
riously mislead the grand jury in its endeavor to obtain information." Id. at
187 (statement of James I.K. Knapp, Deputy Assitant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice).
196. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 465-66 (1975); accord Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). For a more thorough discussion of
Miranda's application, see note 168, supra.
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"Hawaii model" provides the grand jury with the advice of inde-
pendent counsel throughout the proceeding.
A. The "Federal Model"
The model used by all federal courts 197 is governed by Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6.198 Rule 6 does not provide for the
presence of the witness's counsel, but it does not prevent the witness
from leaving the grand jury room during the proceedings to consult
with an attorney. In fact, an important characteristic of the federal
model is that it permits a witness to leave to consult with an attor-
ney. 1
99
Jurisdictions vary as to how often a witness can consult with
counsel. Many federal courts permit witnesses to consult after each
question so that the lawyer may have a complete record of all of
questions asked.200  Other jurisdictions are more stringent. Some
limit consultation in the interest of time.20 1 Others limit consultation
to questions of privileges and do not permit questions about strategic
decisions.20 2 These variations are attempts to retain the grand jury's
efficient and investigatory nature. Jurisdictions that impose limits do
so because they are worried about many delays "wear[ing] the grand
jury down.', 203 They see no reason to allow for consultation if a
question is not difficult.20 4 Those jurisdictions that impose no re-
strictions find that litigation over refused consultation invokes even
197. The name "federal model" does not mean that the model is used exclu-
sively in the federal system. In fact, several states also use this system.
198. Rule 6(d) permits only the grand jurors, witnesses, the prosecuting at-
torney, and a stenographer or recording device operator in the grand jury room.
An interpreter may also be present if necessary. The grand jurors are alone
only during voting or deliberations. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
199. See Amy Bushyeager & Maria N. Nikiforos, Twenty-Sixth Annual Re-
view of Criminal Procedure: Grand Jury, 85 GEO. L.J. 1002, 1020 & n.876
(1997). The Department of Justice has published grand jury practice guide-
lines. These guidelines state if the witness has retained counsel, the grand jury
will permit the witness a "reasonable opportunity to step outside the grand jury
room to consult with counsel" if the witness desires. 7 DEP'T OF JUSTICE
MANUAL § 9-11.150(D) (Supp. 1998-4).
200. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 815(c), at 456.
201. See id.; Bushyeager & Nikiforos, supra note 199, at 1020.
202. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 815(c), at 456.
203. Id.
204. See id.
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more delay, and that it is too difficult to determine whether a ques-
tion relates to privilege or to a strategic concern.2 °5 Both limited and
unlimited consultation support the witness's privilege against self-
incrimination.
The federal model allows jurisdictions to preserve both the na-
ture of the grand jury and the witness's privilege against self-
incrimination. Interruptions can be limited in number and scope.
The proceeding remains investigative, and does not become adver-
sarial, because the interruptions only permit a witness to consult, and
not the witness's counsel to object or otherwise disrupt the flow of
the grand jury proceeding. Because witnesses are already expected
to consult with counsel, formal recognition of the right would not
alter the federal model-it would just ensure that prosecutors treat
witnesses fairly.
B. The "State Model"
The "state model" goes further than the federal model in allow-
ing counsel to accompany the witness inside the grand jury room.
More than a dozen states have enacted statutes that at least permit
target witnesses, if not all witnesses, to consult counsel inside the
grand jury room. 20 6 The statutes usually have provisions that limit
counsel's role207 to advising the witness.
208
Whether the law should provide for the presence of counsel has
been hotly debated over the last twenty years. 20 9 Supporters of re-
form argue that the federal model is inadequate, and that the state
model provides witnesses with needed protection against witness
harassment. The state model allows counsel to advise, and puts
205. See id.
206. See id. § 8.15(b), at 455. See, e.g., Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Va-
lidity and Cons ruction of Statutes Permitting Grand Jury Witnesses to Be Ac-
companied by Counsel, 90 A.L.R.3D 1340 (1980) (citing cases from jurisdic-
tions including Colorado, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York).
207. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 8.15(b), at 455.
208. See id. Massachusetts, for example, provides that "[a]ttorneys for the
Commonwealth ... the witness under examination, the attorney for the wit-
ness, and... persons who are necessary... may be present while the grand
jury is in session. The attorney for the witness shall make no objections or ar-
guments or otherwise address the grand jury or the prosecuting attorney."
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
209. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 40, § 8.15(b), at 455.
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witnesses at ease.2 1 0  Opponents of this model view it as open to
abuse by counsel and believe that the burdens it places on the grand
jury's ability to function outweigh the protection witnesses re-
21ceive.   In their view, the federal model safely and adequately
guarantees a witness' privilege against self-incrimination.
2 12
The state model preserves the witness's Fifth Amendment
privilege; but the question is whether it changes grand jury proceed-
ings too much. Grand jury proceedings are not supposed to be trials.
They sacrifice time-consuming, adversarial procedures in favor of
rapid, inquisitorial proceedings intended only to determine whether
there is probable cause to indict. The closer a particular state system
moves towards a trial-type grand jury proceeding, the more effi-
ciency the grand jury will lose. That loss will likely not translate into
an equal gain for witness' rights. The grand jury is, at its best, the
screen used to determine whether there should even be a trial. Pro-
viding a screen for the screen is wasteful.
But witnesses may need to consult an attorney during grand jury
proceedings. To the extent a witness can do so inside the grand jury
room without creating the beginnings of a "pre-pre-trial" proceeding,
the state model works well. And it follows that an attorney can pro-
vide better advice if she hears exactly what is transpiring, rather than
relying on the witness to recount everything accurately.1 3
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. The advantages and disadvantages of having witness counsel present in
the grand jury will be further explored by the United States Judicial Confer-
ence. By September 1, 1999, the Judicial Conference is required to:
prepare and submit.., a report evaluating whether an amendment to
Rule 6 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permitting the
presence in the grand jury room of counsel for a witness who is testi-
fying before the grand jury would further the interests of justice and
law enforcement... [and] shall consider the views of the Department
of Justice, the organized Bar, the academic legal community, and
other interested parties.
H.R. 4276, 105th Cong. § 622 (1998).
In conducting this study, the Judicial Conference should research and report
grand jury witnesses' attitudes toward the presence of counsel. Witnesses'
perspectives would either support or refute the views of the Department of
Justice, the Bar, and the legal community, and would help to provide a com-
plete picture of the grand jury system.
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C. The "Hawaii Model"
This Comment has so far only considered grand jury systems
from the perspective of witnesses' constitutional rights. Hawaii has
taken a completely different approach and has instituted reforms that
target the grand jury's lack of independence.214 In 1978, Hawaii be-
gan providing grand juries with their own independent counsel. The
goal was to increase the grand jury's independence by minimizing
the prosecutor's influence.215  Counsel for the grand jury are ap-
pointed by the state's chief justice, serve one year terms, and are
available to advise the grand jury on any legal matters that arise
during the proceeding.2 16 It has been suggested that those states that
choose to follow Hawaii's lead should require that the grand jury's
counsel be a lawyer who practices in the district, to reinforce the
grand jury's historic role as a community voice.217 Statutes should
not allow counsel to serve any longer than the grand jury itself.
218
Counsel are permitted to advise the grand jury about hearing excul-
patory evidence and about learning how evidence was obtained.219
Armed with improved and impartial legal understanding, the grand
jury would be able to weigh all of the information in determining
whether to return an indictment.220 Grand jury counsel would help
restore objectivity to the grand jury process.221
The Hawaii model does not directly address the witness's Fifth
Amendment right to consult with counsel, but it could. The model
gives rise to possibilities that do not exist under the other models.
Using it as a springboard, it is not a far leap to suggest that counsel
could be appointed for the grand jury witness as well. Perhaps coun-
sel appointed for the grand jury could be made available for witness
consultation, 222 or entirely different counsel could be appointed for
214. See Susan W. Brenner, Is the Grand Jury Worth Keeping?, 81
JUDICATURE 190, 198 (1998) (arguing that the grand jury has lost its inde-
pendence-its principal value-and that it must be restored).
215. See id.
216. See id. at 198-99.
217. See Brenner, supra note 96, at 124.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 125 & n.228.
220. See id. at 125-26.
221. See id. at 126.
222. This option, however, would be very difficult in practice. Ethically, a
lawyer's loyalty to one client prohibits representing another client whose inter-
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the witness. The Hawaii model demonstrates that there are many dif-
ferent ways to approach the grand jury proceeding and that a differ-
ent approach can actually work.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Judge Hawkins suggested,223 one might think that Gabbert v.
Conn is not an American story. Rather, it is one for audiences who
applaud prosecutors' win-at-all-costs strategies. But win-at-all-costs
prosecutors are not heroes. They are and should be expected to use
their power responsibly.
Where prosecutors "have all the tools,"224 as they do in grand
jury proceedings, they may take advantage of a witness and prevent
the witness from consulting with counsel. The result may be the
witness's unknowing waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination. As such, preventing a witness from consulting with
an attorney undercuts the witness's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and eviscerates the grand jury's protective func-
tion.
Even after Conn v. Gabbert, the underlying issue still remains:
Does a grand jury witness have a right to consult counsel?221 The
witness should have such a right. Recognition of the witness's right
will not create a procedural vacuum that legislatures will have to
scramble to fill because there are models already in place that pro-
vide grand jury witnesses with ways to consult counsel. But legisla-
tures will have to decide which model will best suits their jurisdic-
tion. All jurisdictions should at least adopt the federal model, and all
should consider implementing some version of the Hawaii model.
ests are directly adverse. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.7(a) (1998) (discussing direct conflicts). Representing the grand jury and the
grand jury witness gives rise to at least potential conflicts, if not direct con-
flicts. See id. Rule 1.7(b) (discussing potential conflicts). It would be ex-
tremely difficult for a lawyer to advance the grand jury's search for the truth
while seeking to protect the witness's best interests. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that the grand jury and witness could waive these conflicts. See id. Rules
1.7(a)(2), 1.7(b)(2) & cmt. The disclosure required for a valid waiver would
probabl violate the grand jury secrecy rule.
223 ee Audio tape of Oral Argument, supra note 1 (statement of
Judge Michael Daly Hawkins).
224. Id. (statement of Judge Charles R. Weiner).
225. No. 97-1802, 1999 WL 181181, at *5.
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Combining these two models will restore the grand jury's independ-
ence and at the same time protect witnesses' rights. All witnesses
deserve a determination by an independent grand jury and should
therefore be entitled to the reassuring presence and professional ad-
vice of their attorneys.
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